_SOcrates (good reader) being demanded how a man might speake that which should be best and acceptable to all men, most wiselie (as one in all his life wholie giuen to serch and saie the truth in eue|rie thing) answered: That we then speake best & most to be allowed, when we speake nothing but that which we best and perfectlie know. For we know nothing excellentlie well, but such things as are often heard by vs from others, manie times repeated by our selues; and that which is com|monlie receiued, imbraced, approoued, and vsed by all men. Now those things are most vsed which concerne publike affaires, and such publike af|faires are most knowne when they end in publike action; & publike action, so farre foorth as it concerneth the thing doone, must needs be true that the same was so doone in that order, as it was openlie sene to be doone. Wherby might be concluded, that in chronicling and treating of publike affaires, we should speake that which is best, which is most acceptable, & most true: bicause we report things doone in the eies of all men. But how trulie that is performed in some new writers, it is well knowne to all men of iudgement. For such is the affection of our age, that some of malice, and some for flatterie, and euerie one to feed their owne disposition, doo so glose things publiklie doone, as with a certeine witcherie of words, they like Circes transforme the things doone in publike shew to be of other shapes than they were indeed. Whereby Socrates maie now seeme to be confuted, in saieng, that they speake best that speake things receiued of all men, and that be com|mon to the world: for so shall misreporting and flatterie, a thing commonlie knowne and vsed of all men, be the best speech; which in truth neither is nor can be. Now what I haue seene and knowne in that, as well of things at home as of things abroad, I forbeare to write; and for that cause also might most iustlie restraine my pen (wri|ting vpon the report of others) both now and hereafter from treating of such publike affaires, to the end my selfe should not run into the danger of a like falsifier or misreporter. But then on the contrarie part, when I fall to an other exposition of the same saieng of Socrates, that he speaketh best, that speaketh that which he best knoweth, and that we best know the things which are commonlie receiued, and that we receiue those for soundest which time trieth to be most true, and those things which be most true are such as are knowne to be publikelie doone; I suppose I shall speake best and most acceptablie in writing publike affaires; considering that I am not sworne to anie faction, nor carried with hate or loue, nor bewitched with promise of gaine or honour, nor inforced to turne to the right or left hand, but onelie left at libertie to make truth the daughter of time to be the common end, knowledge, and report of publike things: sith the end of labor, of contemplation of studie, & fruit of writing (as appeareth 2. Met. 4.) is the atteining of truth, and not that perpetuitie or mémorie of a famous name or report, a thing alwaies sought by me to be auoided, being onlie content in secrecie to relie my selfe vpon the recording of truth, which of all things (in my mind) is most pleasant, bicause the same is alwaie a conqueror. For as saith Ne|hemias, Truth is great and dooth mightilie preuaile. Wherefore, as I said, sith those things be most true & best knowne which are publikelie doone, and that they are publikelie doone that sort to anie action in the common|welth: we then conclude that we write best and most acceptablie, when we trulie set downe a common truth of common occurrents doone in the common-wealth; bicause that such things trulie reported, doo conclude with Socrates that we speake and write best in declaring a deed trulie doone, in that order (without ambages, gloses, or parcialities) as the same was most trulie performed touching the truth of that outward act.